Dee W. Christiansen and Martin Jay Christiansen v. John A. Westman : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Dee W. Christiansen and Martin Jay Christiansen v.
John A. Westman : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Kent Holland, Gordon J. Swenson; Anderson & Holland; Richard S. Nemelka; attorneys for
defendants.
Bryce D. Panzer, R. Scott Howell; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; attorneys for plaintiffs.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Christiansen v. Westman, No. 880190.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2133
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH * * * B R , E F 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 ) 
DOCKET NO. J&Qjg&^Au E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEE W. CHRISTIANSEN and MARTIN JAY 
CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs . 
JOHN A. WESTMAN, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
HAROLD W. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
88-0190-M 
Supreme Court No. 860581 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third 
Court In and For Salt Lake County, 
The Honorable Judith M. Billing 
Judicial District 
State of Utah, 
s, Presiding 
J. KENT HOLLAND 
GORDON J. SWENSON 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Harold W. 
Taylor 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
2046 East 4800 South 
Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for John A. Westman 
BRYCE D. 
R. SCOTT 
SNOW, CHR 
10 Exchan^ 
Post Officl 
Salt Lake 
Attorneys 
PANZER 
LOWELL 
STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
e Place, Eleventh Floor 
e Box 45000 
City, Utah 84145 
for Christiansens 
I 
WAY 151987 
~Gte*.«"P w n w C o u r t' U t a h 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEE W. CHRISTIANSEN and MARTIN JAY 
CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
JOHN A. WESTMAN, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
HAROLD W. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Supreme Court No. 860581 
RESPONDENTS* BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
The Honorable Judith M. Billings, Presiding 
J. KENT HOLLAND 
GORDON J. SWENSON 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Harold W. 
Taylor 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
2046 East 4800 South 
Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for John A. Westman 
BRYCE D. PANZER 
R. SCOTT HOWELL 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Christiansens 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Neither The "One Action Rule" Nor Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) Applies In 
This Action 6 
POINT II. Defendant Taylor Failed to Prove His 
Counterclaim For Interference With 
The Contractual Relations 10 
CONCLUSION 13 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Bullington v. Mize, 478 P.2d 500 (Utah 1970) 
Foster Lumber Co. v. Weston Constructors, Inc., 
521 P.2d 1294 (Colo. App. 1974) 
Certified Realty Corp. v. Smith, 597 P.2d 1043 
(Colo. 1979) 
Mickelson v. Anderson, 81 Utah 444, 19 P.2d 
1033, 1036 (1932) 
Soter v. Wasatch Development Corp., 443 P.2d 
663, 664 (Utah 1968) 
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 
293 (Utah 1982) 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953, as amended) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 to -2 (1953, as amended) 
- l i -
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEE W. CHRISTIANSEN and MARTIN JAY 
CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
JOHN A. WESTMAN, Supreme Court No. 860581 
Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
HAROLD W. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Respondents Dee W. Christiansen ("Dee") and Martin Jay 
Christiansen ("Jay") submit the following Brief on Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Christiansens believe the following issues are 
presented by this appeal: 
1. Do the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-32 or 
78-37-1 to -2 (1953, as amended), bar plaintiffs* action, since 
defendants granted to plaintiffs a deed of trust on real 
property located in the State of Colorado during the pendency 
of the lawsuit? 
2. Did the trial court properly dismiss defendant 
Taylor's counterclaim for intentional interference with 
contract? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced to recover monies owed under two 
promissory notes executed by the defendants to purchase Dee and 
Jay's interests in a partnership that was formed to develop 
certain property located in Colorado, Defendant Taylor filed 
counterclaims against the plaintiffs, alleging 
misrepresentation and claiming that Dee and Jay wrongfully 
induced Mr. Taylor to enter into the agreement to purchase the 
partnership interests and sign the promissory notes.1 Mr. 
Taylor also claimed that Dee and Jay intentionally interfered 
with an alleged contract to sell his partnership interest to 
Stephen Geiger. 
At the trial, the court granted judgment in favor of Dee 
and Jay for the full amount owed on the promissory notes, 
together with attorney's fees. The court also dismissed Mr. 
Taylor's counterclaims upon motion made after the close of Mr. 
*The misrepresentation allegations were also asserted as a 
defense to plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. R. 95-96. 
Taylor's case in chief. Mr. Taylor timely appealed; however, 
no appeal was taken by Mr. Westman. Mr. Taylor has abandoned 
his appeal as it relates to the counterclaim for 
misrepresentation, since no argument is made thereon in his 
brief on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Christiansens believe Mr. Taylor's Statement of Facts 
should be supplemented as it relates to the counterclaim for 
intentional interference with contract. The Christiansens 
believe that, except for evidence relating to damages, the 
following constitutes a complete statement of the evidence 
relating to Mr. Taylor's claim of interference with contract. 
Mr. Taylor testified that he had an agreement to sell his 
partnership interest in BWC Development to Stephen Geiger, in 
about October of 1980. R. 467-68; Tr. 81-82 (copies of the 
cited portions of the transcript are attached as Addendum A.) 
The agreed price was $350,000. R. 468; Tr. 82. Mr. Geiger 
gave Mr. Taylor a check for $50,000 as part payment, with the 
remainder to be paid in yearly payments. Mr. Geiger's check 
was cashed by Mr. Taylor. R. 468; Tr. 82. 
In October of 1980, Steve Geiger, Harold Taylor, John 
Westman, Dee, and, possibly, Jay, met at the Holiday Inn in 
Park City, Utah. There was some discussion regarding BWC 
Development. R. 469; Tr. 83. Mr. Taylor testified as follows 
regarding that meeting: 
Q. (By Mr. Holland) Did the deal — was the deal 
cancelled at this meeting? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you think the deal had been completed prior 
to this meeting? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And how was the deal cancelled? 
A. During the course of the conversation Dee 
Christiansen looked at Geiger and said, this is 
not a good deal. I [you?] don't want to do it. 
Q. And then what happened? 
A. Well at that point I was infuriated because I 
wanted out of the situation. 
R. 470; Tr. 84. 
Upon cross-examination, Mr. Taylor stated that Dee, Jay and 
John Westman wanted him to stay in the partnership because he 
could borrow money. R. 487-88; Tr. 101-02. Mr. Taylor also 
testified that Dee wanted Mr. Geiger to be involved in another 
deal that Dee was doing. R. 488; Tr. 102. 
Other than the statement made at the Holiday Inn meeting by 
Dee Christiansen to Mr. Geiger, that Mr. Geiger didn't want to 
do the deal, there were no other statements by Dee or Jay 
regarding Mr. Taylor's agreement with Mr. Geiger. R. 488; Tr. 
102. 
John Westman believed that Jay was present at the meeting, 
although Mr. Taylor could not recall. R. 469, 524; Tr. 83, 
138. Mr. Westman does not recall any statements made to Mr. 
Geiger about entering into the agreement with Mr. Taylor during 
that meeting at the Holiday Inn. R. 524; Tr. 138. Mr. Westman 
did recall, however, that there was discussion at the meeting 
regarding whether the development of the Colorado property 
should be financed by syndication or borrowings. R. 530-32; 
Tr. 144-46. 
Contrary to the assertion of Mr. Taylor, there is no 
evidence establishing, or even suggesting, that Dee's motive in 
making the statement to Mr. Geiger was to force Mr. Taylor to 
buy out the Christiansens1 interest in BWC. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Neither the "one action rule" nor Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 
(1953) applies in this action. The property upon which 
plaintiffs were given a deed of trust is located in Colorado. 
Neither of the above statutes have any extra-territorial 
effect, nor do they embody any fundamental public policy that 
would be applied in the absence of an applicable statute. 
Defendant Taylor failed to prove any element of a cause of 
action for wrongful interference with contractual rights. 
There was no evidence of a wrongful and malicious act, nor did 
the evidence show that Dee caused the contract to be breached 
or that Dee's recommendation to Stephen Geiger resulted in 
damage to Mr. Taylor. Any statements by Dee to Stephen Geiger 
were justified by sound business judgment and were therefore 
privileged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NEITHER THE "ONE ACTION RULE" NOR UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-1-32 (1953) APPLIES IN THIS ACTION. 
Defendant Taylor maintains that plaintiffs' Complaint 
should be dismissed because foreclosure of a deed of trust on 
property located in Colorado (Exhibit 11), given as security 
for plaintiffs' promissory notes during the pendency of this 
action, is a necessary prerequisite to a personal judgment 
against defendant Taylor. Mr. Taylor relies upon Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 57-1-32 and 78-37-1 to -2 (1953, as amended). These 
statutes do not govern because the property that was pledged as 
collateral for defendants' obligations is not located in Utah. 
In Bullington v. Mize, 478 P.2d 500 (Utah 1970), the 
plaintiff sought a deficiency judgment in connection with the 
foreclosure sale of certain real property located in Texas. 
The defendant asserted that plaintiff's right to recover a 
deficiency judgment was controlled by the fair market value 
limitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953). The 
Utah Supreme Court held that the fair market value limitation 
of this statute applied only to trust deeds on property in 
Utah, noting: 
. . . The entire statutory scheme concerning trust 
deeds, as provided in § 57-1-19 through 57-1-36, could 
not have any extra-territorial effect. We must, 
therefore, conclude that the statutory protection 
extended solely to debtors whose obligations were 
secured by trust deeds on land in Utah. 
Id. at 503. 
The court also held that the fair market value limitation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 was not supported by a fundamental 
public policy that should be applied in the absence of a 
statutory mandate. 
Not only does the language of § 57-1-32, U.C.A. 1953, 
indicate a legislative intent that the relief provided 
debtors is restricted to trust deeds on Utah land, but 
the underlying policy of the law, with the noted 
statutory exception, is otherwise. 
Id. at 504. 
The "one action rule," stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 
(1953), is similarly limited to mortgages on lands in Utah. 
The statute merely establishes the procedure for foreclosing a 
mortgage on lands in Utah. As with the trust deed provisions, 
the "one action rule" can have no extra-territorial effect. 
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Since Utah's statutes relate solely to mortgages and trust 
deeds on property located in Utah, the choice of law question 
argued by defendant Taylor is not presented unless there is a 
difference between Colorado law and Utah's common law regarding 
the procedure plaintiffs are required to use to collect the 
debt. Absent a difference between Colorado and Utah law, no 
true conflict is present. Since both Colorado law and Utah's 
common law allow plaintiffs' action, the trial court properly 
refused to dismiss the Complaint. 
In Colorado, a secured party may proceed either to final 
judgment on a debt, to foreclose a trust deed, or to seek both 
remedies at the same time. See Foster Lumber Co. v. Weston 
Constructors, Inc., 521 P.2d 1294 (Colo. App. 1974); Certified 
Realty Corp. v. Smith, 597 P.2d 1043 (Colo. 1979). Utah's 
common law recognizes the rule that a creditor may pursue 
foreclosure or a judgment on the debt, either successively or 
concurrently. In Mickelson v. Anderson, 8.1 Utah 444, 19 P.2d 
1033, 1036 (1932), the Supreme Court noted: 
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the rule 
is that a creditor whose debt is secured by mortgage 
has two separate and independent remedies, which he 
may pursue successively or concurrently, one being on 
the note against the person or property of the debtor, 
and the other by foreclosure to subject the mortgaged 
property to its payment. 19 R.C.L. 511. This rule, 
however, is not applicable in this state because of 
the statute, Comp. Laws, Utah 1917, § 72-30, providing 
that there can be but one action for the recovery of a 
debt secured by mortgage. 
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Hence, in the absence of an applicable statute, Utah recognizes 
plaintiffs1 right to proceed directly against the defendants 
without first proceeding against the collateral that was 
pledged to secure defendant's obligations. 
Even assuming that a true conflict of laws is presented, 
the procedure in this case was appropriate. First, contrary to 
the assertion of defendant Taylor, there was no applicable law 
chosen by the parties regarding the deed of trust. The deed of 
trust was given pursuant to the Assignment (Exhibit 7), which 
was executed in the spring of 1984, during the pendency of this 
action. While the original agreement (Exhibit 1) pursuant to 
! 
which defendants agreed to buy plaintiffs' partnership 
interests in BWC directed the application of Utah law, no such 
provision was contained in the later Assignment. 
Secondly, a contrary intent of the parties is evident from 
the language of the Assignment. Paragraph 18 of the Assignment 
states that the " . . . Assignment . . . is not intended in any 
way to prejudice or waive the Christiansens' rights under 
either the Agreement, the Promissory Notes, or the lawsuit 
. . . ." It is axiomatic that absent the Assignment, and the 
trust deed given pursuant thereto, plaintiffs had the right to 
seek judgment on the promissory notes in the lawsuit. It was 
therefore agreed, in advance, that defendant's execution of the 
Assignment and the trust deed would not prejudice the 
Christiansens' right to proceed to final judgment under the 
then pending lawsuit. 
Utah's statutes do not apply to foreclosure of property 
located outside of the state. In the absence of applicable 
statutes, the laws of both Colorado and Utah permit plaintiffs 
to proceed directly against defendant Taylor even though 
foreclosure of the Colorado property has not taken place. Even 
if the Utah statutes apply, defendant Taylor expressly waived 
application of those statutes by agreeing that the Assignment 
given during the pendency of the action would be without 
prejudice to, or result in a waiver of, the Christiansens' 
rights in the pending action. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT TAYLOR FAILED TO PROVE HIS 
COUNTERCLAIM FOR INTERFERENCE WITH THE 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS. 
Harold Taylor claimed that Dee and Jay Christiansen 
interfered with his contract with Stephen Geiger. Mr. Taylor 
claimed that he had a binding contract to sell his interest in 
BWC to Stephen Geiger for the sum of $350,000 and that he had 
received a $50,000 down payment. Mr. Taylor failed, however, 
to establish any element of his counterclaim. 
In order to have established a cause of action for wrongful 
interference with the Geiger contract, Mr. Taylor "would have 
to show that [plaintiffs], without justification, by some 
wrongful and malicious act, interfered with the [defendant's] 
right of contract, and that actual damage resulted." Soter v. 
Wasatch Development Corp., 443 P.2d 663, 664 (Utah 1968). 
"[I]f a party has an interest to protect, he is privileged to 
prevent performance of the contract which threatens it." Id. 
at 665. 
The more recent case of Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. 
Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), addresses, in general, the 
doctrine of intentional interference with advantageous economic 
relations and establishes, in particular, the elements for the 
tort of intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations. This tort is closely related to intentional 
interference with contractual rights in that it recognizes 
interference with potential or existing economic relations. 
Leigh Furniture set forth the following elements of the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations: 
(1) That the defendant intentionally interfered with 
the plaintiff's existing or potential economic 
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. 
Id. at 304. Privilege is an affirmative defense. Id. 
-II-
An improper purpose would include "a purely malicious 
motive, in the sense of spite and the desire to do harm to the 
plaintiff for its own sake" and "officious intermeddling for no 
other reason than a desire to interfere." Id., at 307. 
"Improper means" are those contrary to law, such as violations 
of statutes, regulations, or recognized common law rules, 
unless such means are a constitutionally protected activity 
such as the exercise of First Amendment rights. Specific 
examples given by the court in Leigh Furniture include 
"violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or 
misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, 
or disparaging falsehood," as well as violations of established 
standards of a trade or profession, _ld. at 308. 
When analyzed under the foregoing standards, it is clear 
that Mr. Taylor failed to establish any of the elements of his 
claim for interference with the contract with Mr. Geiger. 
First, there is no evidence whatsoever regarding acts or 
conduct of Jay in regards to the Geiger contract. Secondly, 
the only act of Dee that is complained of is a statement Dee 
made to Mr. Geiger, in the presence of John Westman, Harold 
Taylor, and possibly Jay Christiansen, to the effect that Mr. 
Geiger did not want to do the deal with Mr. Taylor and that it 
was not a good deal. By no stretch of the imagination can this 
statement be considered a "wrongful and malicious act." 
The trial court found that the statement of Dee 
Christiansen, if made, was not proved to be the cause for the 
breakdown of the agreement between Messrs. Geiger and Taylor. 
R. 536; Tr. 150. There was no evidence whatsoever that the 
statement was made maliciously or with an improper purpose. To 
the contrary, Mr. Taylor testified that he believed Dee made 
the statement in order to keep Mr. Taylor in BWC (because Mr. 
Taylor had the ability to borrow money), and to keep Mr. Geiger 
available for another deal Dee wanted to do. R. 487-88; Tr. 
101-02. To the extent Dee's statement influenced Mr. Geiger1s 
decision to ask for a return of his $50,000 down payment, Dee's 
motivation was not to injure Mr. Taylor but rather to further 
Dee's economic self-interest. 
Even interpreted in the light most favorable to Mr. Taylor, 
the evidence failed to establish any element of the 
counterclaim for interference with the Geiger contract. The 
trial court properly dismissed the counterclaim at the close of 
Mr. Taylor's case in chief. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in full 
and the matter remanded to the district court with instructions 
to determine the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded 
plaintiffs in connection with this appeal. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of May, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Bryce^B^ Panzer 
R. Scott Howell 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
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CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of May, 1987, I 
caused to be hand-delivered four copies of the foregoing 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF to each of the following: 
J. Kent Holland 
Gordon J. Swenson 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
623 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Richard S. Nemelka 
2046 East 4800 South 
Suite 103 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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DEE AND JAY WERE PLANNING ON SELLING A LOT OF THEIR LOTS 
TO THEIR RELATIVES. NOW, I DON'T KNOW THE NUMBER ON THAT 
BUT THEY SAID THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO SELL THE LOTS TO THEIR 
RELATIVES. 
Q DID THEY EVER PUT ANY KIND OF BALL PARK FIGURE 
ON THE NUMBER? 
A THE NUMBER I RECALL IS 30 OR kO OR SOME NUMBER 
LIKE THAT. 
Q • DID THEY EVER SELL ANY LOTS TO ANY OF THEIR 
FRIENDS AND RELATIVES WHILE THEY WERE INVOLVED IN B.W.C.? 
A NO. 
Q DID MR. WESTMAN SELL ANY OF--DID THEY CLOSE ON 
THOSE 130 LOTS THAT WERE REPRESENTED? 
A NO. 
Q HOW MANY LOTS DID MR. WESTMAN SELL? 
A I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PUT AN EXACT NUMBER ON 
IT. I 'D SAY LESS THAN 10. 
Q I CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO OCTOBER OF 1980. DID 
YOU ATTEMPT TO SELL YOUR INTEREST AT THAT TIME? 
A YES. 
Q WHEN WAS THAT? 
A SOME TIME IN OCTOBER OF 1980. 
Q AND WHO WERE YOU TRYING TO SELL IT TO? 
A A PERSON NAMED STEVE GEIGER. 
Q AND COULD YOU KIND OF DESCRIBE WHAT WENT ON 
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BETWEEN YOU AND MR. GEIGER? 
MR. PANZER: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. IT CALLS 
FOR A NARRATIVE. WE OUGHT TO HAVE SOME FOUNDATION IF HE'S 
GOING TO TALK ABOUT CONVERSATIONS. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: OVERRULED. 
A (BY THE WITNESS) GEIGER CAME TO ME AND SAID THAT 
HE WOULD LIKE TO BUY MY QUARTER INTEREST OF B.W.C. 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) WHAT WAS YOUR REPLY? 
A I, OF COURSE, SAID I'M WILLING TO SELL. 
Q DID YOU SET A PRICE? 
A WE SET A PRICE. 
Q WHAT WAS THAT PRICE? 
A $350,000.00. 
Q WAS THAT TO BE PAID ALL AT ONCE? 
A NO. 
Q HOW WAS THAT TO BE PAID? 
A I DON'T REMEMBER EXACTLY HOW IT WAS TO BE PAID 
NOW, BUT HE DID GIVE ME A CHECK FOR $50,000.00 WHICH I CASHED 
AND IT CLEARED. AND THEN I THINK THE REST OF IT WAS SET 
UP ON YEARLY PAYMENTS WITH SOME KIND OF INTEREST ATTACHED. 
Q AFTER YOU HAD RECEIVED THE CHECK AND CASHED IT 
WAS THERE ANY OTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. GEIGER? 
A I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING THIS AGREEMENT 
TO PAPER AND--
] 
__82 
w004C 
1 MR. PANZER: YOUR HONOR, I'D OBJECT--THE QUESTION 
2 WAS YES OR NO. WE ARE GOING TO BE GETTING INTO, AND WE HAVE 
3 ALREADY GOTTEN INTO HEARSAY, WHAT MR. GEIGER SAID. THE 
4 QUESTION CALLED FOR WHETHER HE HAD ANY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS 
5 WITH MR. GEIGER AND THE ANSWER IS NON-RESPONSIVE. 
6 JUDGE BILLINGS: I WILL OVERRULE THAT OBJECTION. 
7 MR. HOLLAND: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
8 I A (BY THE WITNESS) STEVE GEIGER AND I THEN MET 
9 WITH JOHN WESTMAN AND DEE CHRISTIANSEN AND HIMSELF, GEIGER, 
10 AT THE HOLIDAY INN IN PARK CITY. 
11 Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) WAS JAY CHRISTIANSEN THERE? 
12 A I DO NOT RECALL. I DO NOT THINK SO. 
13 Q ALL RIGHT. WHEN WAS THAT MEETING HELD? 
14 A PARDON ME? 
15 Q WHEN WAS THAT MEETING HELD? 
16 A THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN OCTOBER OF 1980. 
17 Q HAD YOU ALREADY CASHED THE CHECK AT THAT POINT? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q ALL RIGHT. AND WHAT HAPPENED AT THAT MEETING? 
20 A WE DISCUSSED HOW WE WERE GOING TO DO THIS THING. 
21 AND GEIGER HAD SOME IDEA THAT HE WAS GOING TO MAKE IT--
22 MR. NEMELKA: YOUR HONOR, I AM GOING TO OBJECT 
23 AS TO WHAT MR. GEIGER'S IDEA WAS OR WHAT MR. GEIGER SAID. 
24 IT »S PURE HEARSAY. 
25 JUDGE BILLINGS: SUSTAINED. 
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Q (BY MR. HOLLAND) DID THE DEAL--WAS THE DEAL 
CANCELLED AT THIS MEETING? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU THINK THE DEAL HAD BEEN COMPLETED PRIOR 
TO THIS MEETING? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q AND HOW WAS THE DEAL CANCELLED? 
A DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION DEE 
CHRISTIANSEN LOOKED AT GEIGER AND SAID, THIS IS NOT A GOOD 
DEAL. I DON'T WANT TO DO IT. 
Q AND THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
A WELL, AT THAT POINT I WAS INFURIATED BECAUSE I 
WANTED OUT OF THE SITUATION. 
Q WHY DID YOU WANT OUT OF THE SITUATION? 
A I HAD OTHER THINGS TO DO AND I HAD SOME HEALTH 
PROBLEMS AT THE TIME AND HAD BEEN TOLD BY MY DOCTOR TO GET 
STRESS OUT OF MY LIFE. AND I JUST WANTED TO GET AWAY FROM 
IT. 
Q I SEE. WHEN WERE YOU FIRST APPROACHED ABOUT 
PURCHASING THE INTEREST OF THE CHRISTIANSENS? 
A I BELIEVE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN SOME TIME AFTER 
THE 1ST OF JANUARY OF 1981. I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHEN. 
Q SO HOW MANY MONTHS AFTER THE GEIGER INCIDENT WAS 
THAT? 
A TWO OR THREE. 
84 
H-ross-exammation or Mr. Taylor oy Mr. panzerj 
AS YOU THOUGHT THEY WERE GOING TO PERFORM, ISN'T THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S TRUE. 
Q AND THAT'S THE REASON YOU WANTED THEM OUT OF THE 
PARTNERSHIP, ISN'T IT? 
A WELL, I HAD MORE REASONS THAN THAT. 
Q ONE OF THE REASONS WAS SO THAT YOU COULD GO AHEAD 
AND BORROW MONEY AND DEVELOP THE SUBDIVISION PERSONALLY, 
ISN'T THAT RIGHT? 
A AND PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT 
I PUT IN IT. 
Q AND JUST AFTER YOU SIGNED THIS AGREEMENT AND YOU 
ACQUIRED THE PARTNERSHIP INTEREST DIDN'T YOU AND MR. WESTMAN 
GO DOWN TO ARIZONA AND BORROW WHAT, ABOUT l.h MILLION DOLLARS 
TO DEVELOP THE SUBDIVISION? 
A ABOUT 2.5. 
Q 2.5. NOW, REGARDING MR. GEIGER, WHEN, AGAIN, 
DID THIS HAPPEN, OCTOBER, 1980? 
A RIGHT. 
Q JAY AND DEE AND JOHN WESTMAN WANTED YOU TO STAY 
IN THE PARTNERSHIP; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A I THINK IT'S QUITE OBVIOUS. 
Q AND THEY WERE YOUR PARTNERS AT THE TIME, RIGHT? 
A RIGHT. 
Q AND THEY WANTED YOU IN THERE BECAUSE YOU COULD 
BORROW MONEY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
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A RIGHT. 
Q AND YOU KNEW OR YOU THOUGHT THAT DEE WANTED MR. 
GEIGER TO BE INVOLVED IN ANOTHER DEAL HE WAS DOING; IS THAT 
RIGHT? 
A WELL, HE OBVIOUSLY DID WANT HIM IN ANOTHER DEAL. 
Q OTHER THAN THE STATEMENT THAT YOU'VE RECOUNTED 
AT THE HOLIDAY INN MEETING THAT DEE SAID TO MR. GEIGER THAT 
HE DIDN'T WANT TO DO THE DEAL, DID YOU HEAR ANY OTHER STATE-
MENTS BY DEE OR JAY REGARDING YOUR AGREEMENT WITH MR. GEIGER? 
A THERE WASN'T ANYTHING MORE TO SAY. 
Q YOU HAD NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT WITH MR. GEIGER? 
A I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF PUTTING IT IN WRITING. 
Q YOU GAVE HIM HIS $50,000.00 BACK? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU THINK YOU HAD A BINDING CONTRACT WITH 
MR. GEIGER? 
A I THINK I WOULD HAVE IF I HAD KEPT THE $50,000.00. 
Q WHY DIDN'T YOU KEEP THE 50,000? 
A I DON'T DO BUSINESS THAT WAY. 
Q MR. TAYLOR, YOU MENTIONED THAT THE B.W.C. BORROWED 
TWO AND A HALF MILLION DOLLARS AFTER YOU BOUGHT DEE'S AND 
JAY'S INTEREST; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT WAS THE COLLATERAL FOR THAT LOAN? 
A THE COLLATERAL WAS OUR ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND 
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1 A YES. 
2 Q WHO WAS PRESENT AT THAT MEETING? 
3 I A I THINK DEE AND JAY AND GEIGER AND MR. TAYLOR 
4 AND MYSELF. 
' 5 Q WERE ANY STATEMENTS MADE TO MR. GEIGER ABOUT 
6 ENTERING INTO THE AGREEMENT BY ANYONE AT THAT MEETING? 
7 A I DON 'T REMEMBER. 
8 1 Q IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THERE WERE? 
9 A I SUPPOSE. 
10 Q I S N ' T IT TRUE THAT--WELL, DID MR. GEIGER ASK TO 
11 TERMINATE HIS AGREEMENT AT THAT POINT? 
12 A NO. 
13 Q WHEN DID MR. GEIGER DO SO, IF YOU KNOW? 
14 A IT WAS SOME TIME AFTER THAT. 
15 Q HOW LONG AFTER THAT? 
16 A I HAVE NO IDEA. 
17 Q WHEN DID YOU BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS TO PURCHASE THE 
18 INTEREST OF DEE AND JAY FROM THE B.W.C. PARTNERSHIP? 
19 A I SUPPOSE ABOUT THREE MONTHS BEFORE THE AGREEMENT, 
20 Q SO THE AGREEMENT, I BELIEVE, IS DATED IN MARCH 
21 OF 1981 SO THIS WOULD BE IN DECEMBER OF ' 8 0 , JANUARY O F - -
22 A PROBABLY. 
23 I Q SO THIS WOULD BE SHORTLY FOLLOWING MR. GEIGER'S 
24 REJECTION? 
25 A I DON'T KNOW THE EXACT DATE OF THE MEETING WITH 
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1 MR. PANZER: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR, CALLS FOR 
2 A LEGAL CONCLUSION. 
3 JUDGE BILLINGS: SUSTAINED. 
4 MR. HOLLAND: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. ONE MORE 
5 QUESTION, YOUR HONOR. 
6 ONCE THEY RECEIVED THE LOTS THAT YOU OWED 'EM 
7 WAS ANY MORE MONEY--
8 THE WITNESS: NO. 
9 MR. PANZER: OBJECTION; LEADING. 
10 MR. HOLLAND: THANK YOU. 
II 
12 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. PANZER: 
14 Q MR. WESTMAN, I'D LIKE TO GO BACK TO THE DEALINGS 
15 BETWEEN MR. TAYLOR AND MR. GEIGER. DID YOU PLAY ANY PART 
16 IN THOSE DEALINGS? 
17 A I DID BUT I WASN'T REALLY UP ON WHAT WAS GOING 
18 ON AS FAR AS WHAT WAS SAID AT THAT MEETING. I THINK MR. 
19 TAYLOR LEFT THE MEETING BEFORE IT WAS OVER AND WHAT WAS SAID 
20 I DIDN 'T EVEN HEAR. 
21 Q WERE THERE ANY DISCUSSIONS REGARDING HOW THE 
22 SUBDIVISION WOULD BE DEVELOPED OR FINANCED? 
23 A YES. 
24 Q DID EVERYBODY PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS? 
25 A I SUPPOSE. 
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Q DID MR. TAYLOR HAVE A VIEW AS TO HOW THE DEVELOP-
MENT SHOULD BE FINANCED? 
A I 'M SURE. 
Q YOU DON'T RECALL? 
A I 'LL SAY YES, HE DID. 
Q DO YOU RECALL WHAT HIS VIEW WAS? 
A NO. 
Q DID MR. GEIGER EXPRESS A VIEW AS TO HOW THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBDIVISION SHOULD BE FINANCED? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT DID MR. GEIGER SAY? 
A HE WAS INTERESTED IN FORMING, SELLING LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS OR SOMETHING AND THEN EACH PERSON GET SO MANY 
LOTS OR SOMETHING. 
Q DID MR. TAYLOR EXPRESS ANY AGREEMENT OR DISAGREE-
MENT WITH THAT? 
A I DON »T KNOW. 
Q DID YOU EXPRESS ANY AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT 
WITH THAT? 
A I DISAGREED WITH IT. 
Q WHAT WAS YOUR PREFERRED METHOD? 
A TO JUST SELLING THE LOTS TO INDIVIDUALS. 
Q DID DEE CHRISTIANSEN EXPRESS ANY FEELING ON THE 
SYNDICATION? 
A I DON 'T REMEMBER. 
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Q HOW ABOUT JAY? 
A I DON'T REMEMBER. 
Q IS IT CORRECT THAT YOU HANDLED THE NEGOTIATIONS 
WITH DEE AND JAY TO PURCHASE THEIR INTERESTS? 
A FOR THE MOST PART. 
Q DID DEE AND JAY MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS WHATSO-
EVER TO YOU TO INDUCE YOU TO BUY THEIR INTERESTS? 
A JUST THE NATURAL THING, I SUPPOSE. 
Q YOU DON'T RECALL ANY REPRESENTATIONS? 
A NO. 
MR. PANZER: THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THANK YOU. ANY QUESTIONS, MR. 
NEMELKA? 
MR. NEMELKA: I MAY AS WELL ASK HIM QUESTIONS 
AND THEN WE'LL BE DONE HOPEFULLY. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NEMELKA: 
Q MR. WESTMAN, YOU HEARD THE TESTIMONY OF MR. TAYLOR 
HERE TODAY ON HIS CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST YOU FOR MISREPRESEN-
TATIONS, HAVE YOU NOT? 
A YEAH. 
Q DO YOU RECALL HAVING ANY CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. 
TAYLOR PRIOR TO HIS PURCHASE OF THE CHRISTIANSENS' INTEREST 
IN THE PARTNERSHIP IN REGARDS TO THE SEWER AND WATER AT THE 
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PARTNERSHIP TO DEVELOP THE LAND IN DURANGO. 
AS TO THE STATEMENT MADE OR ALLEGEDLY MADE BY 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN TO MR. BEUCHLER HE WAS A PROSPECTIVE 
PURCHASER OF MR. TAYLOR'S INTEREST IN B.W.C. PARTNERSHIP, 
THE COURT IS NOT PURSUADED THAT THE SINGLE STATEMENT, IF 
MADE, THAT IT WAS NOT A GOOD DEAL IS OF THE SORT THAT WOULD 
TERMINATE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF AN INTER-
EST SUCH AS T H I S . 
FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NO TESTIMONY BY MR. GEIGER 
INDICATING THAT IT WAS, IN FACT, THIS STATEMENT WHICH 
RESULTED IN HIS CHOOSING NOT TO ENTER HIS CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONSHIP WITH MR. TAYLOR. 
FINALLY, THE COURT CAN FIND NO MALICE OR IMPROPER 
PURPOSE BEHIND THE STATEMENT, IF MADE, AND, THEREFORE, UNDER 
UTAH LAW THE COURT BELIEVES IT IS NOT ACTIONABLE. 
THEREFORE, THE COURT WILL DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIM 
OF THE DEFENDANT, TAYLOR, AS AGAINST THE P L A I N T I F F S . 
AS TO THE CROSS-CLAIM, ANY STATEMENTS THAT WERE 
MADE BY THE DEFENDANT, WESTMAN, THE COURT FINDS TO BE THE 
SORT OF STATEMENTS MADE BY PARTNERS IN A BUSINESS DEAL 
SPECULATING AS TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENT AND NOT THE KIND OF 
REPRESENTATIONS THAT COULD BE REASONABLY RELIED UPON TO A 
BUSINESS PERSON'S DETRIMENT AND, THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS 
WHATEVER STATEMENTS WERE MADE, EVEN IF ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
AGREEMENT IN QUESTION, NOT TO BE ACTIONABLE AND WILL, 
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